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ARGUMENT
I.

SPENCER'S SEIZURE OF MR. PARKIN VIOLATED ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION;
THEREFOR ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
ILLEGAL SEIZURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
A.

Mr. Parkin was unlawfully seized where Trooper Spencer lacked the
requisite reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the consensual
encounter.

Mr. Parkin argued in his opening brief that the trial court erred in denying his Motion
to Suppress, specifically because his consent was not voluntary and tainted by the prior police
illegality. In response, the State argued that Mr. Parkin abandoned his trial claim that he was
unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. To the contrary, Mr. Parkin has not
abandoned his Fourth Amendment claim. Mr. Parkin indeed, for all purposes, has asserted

and continues to assert his Fourth Amendment claims, and further emphasizes the flagrant
and illegal police conduct inherent in his Fourth Amendment claims by establishing that he
was also in custody for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes, and that police misconduct
violated that right.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .
.. against unreasonable searches and seizures." Utah Const. Art. I § 14; U.S. Const, amend.
IV. "It is axiomatic that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
embodied in the Utah and United States Constitution is one of the most cherished rights we
possess." State v. Trane, 57P.3d 1052,1057 (Utah 2002). Based upon these constitutional
protections, the scope of an officer's authority to conduct an unreasonable search and seizure
of an individual is restricted.
It is well established that there are three different levels of citizen encounters with
law enforcement officials; each requiring a different degree of justification under the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1991). A level one citizen
encounter occurs when an official encounters a citizen who voluntarily responds to noncoercive questioning. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). An officer
may seize a person at a level two encounter if the officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that that person has committed a serious crime or is about to commit a crime.

2

Id. And a level three encounter occurs when an officer has arrested an individual based
on probable cause that an offense has been or is being committed. Id.
A level one encounter does not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because it is consensual and an individual is not detained against his
will. Id. However, a level two encounter rises to a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment where a reasonable person based on the totality of the circumstances
does not feel free to leave. Id. In order to justify such a seizure, an officer's suspicion
must be supported by "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences." State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996). Additionally, the detention cannot be based
on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion" or a mere hunch. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868(1968).
The initial encounter between Spencer and Mr. Parkin was consensual in nature
because Spencer was called to the scene to investigate an accident. However, the
consensual encounter ended as soon as Spencer concluded the accident investigation.
(SH:19). Thus, when Spencer began questioning Mr. Parkin about the odor of marijuana
and marijuana use, the level once encounter escalated into a level two seizure.
(SH: 19,21). It was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14
because a reasonable person in Mr. Parkin's position would not have felt free to leave at
anytime. Additionally, Spencer's seizure of Mr. Parkin was unlawful because it was not
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, but instead based on mere suspicion.
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In State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185, 191 (Utah App. 2004), this Court did not find
probable cause based on the following facts: the defendant's eyes were red and glossy, the
presence of multiple air fresheners, and the defendant's tongue was "very green" with
bumps on the back of it." This Court found that the Trooper's "mere suspicion" that the
defendant "had at some point in the past, ingested marijuana" was insufficient to support
that the trooper had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id. While Hechtle required
probable cause, and this case requires reasonable articulable suspicion, the same totality
of circumstances approach required for probable cause is used to determine if there are
"specific articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. See City of St. George v.
Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
In this case, the trial court erred in finding that Spencer had reasonable suspicion
to justify the seizure, and in finding that Mr. Parkin's statement that his friends had
smoked marijuana was some corroboration of the odor. (R.85-86). Under the totality of
the circumstances test Spencer did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Parkin
based on the odor of marijuana. Other than the odor, Spencer did not observe any other
indicia of marijuana use. Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for over thirty minutes and did not
believe he was impaired. (SH:37). He also observed that Mr. Parkin did not have glassy,
blood shot eyes or appear to be slurring his words. Id. Thus, Spencer only had a mere
suspicion that Mr. Parkin had recently used marijuana based on the odor.
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The State argues that "Trooper Spencer's question about marijuana suggested that
there may be an innocent explanation for the marijuana odor." Appellee's Brief at 9.
However, that belief cannot be reconciled with Spencer's testimony that "Anytime I smell
marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). Moreover, if Spencer had interrogated Mr. Parkin
about the odor of marijuana under the belief that he might obtain an innocent explanation,
he would have been satisfied with Mr. Parkin's response that "he does have friends that
smoke marijuana" but that he had not smoked any. (SH:20,35). Spencer would not have
continued to request a search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle just to "make sure there wasn't any
marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Furthermore, Mr. Parkin's statement provides no
corroboration that marijuana was in his vehicle. Therefore, Mr. Parkin's seizure was
unlawful because the odor alone was not sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion and
there was no corroborating evidence.
B.

Because Mr. Parkin was illegally seized, any subsequent consent to
search was both involuntary and invalid because it was tainted by
the prior illegality.

In the absence of a warrant, when a defendant is illegally seized, and his or her
rights are violated, for the subsequent search to be valid the State must prove that the
consent to search was (1) voluntary and (2) there was no police exploitation of a prior
illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Hansen, 63
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002)(setting forth the multiple prong test for voluntariness of consent).
In its response brief the State argues that the trial court correctly concluded that Mr.
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Parkin's consent was freely and voluntarily given. It bases its argument on the following:
Spencer "did not claim authority to search the car" and "he did not draw his weapon or
make a show of force". App. Brf. at 8. Even though Spencer did not verbally articulate a
right to search the car, he showed a claim of authority by accusing Mr. Parkin of smoking
marijuana and possessing it in his vehicle. (SH:36). He particularly showed authority to
search by asking if he could "make sure there wasn't any marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Even
the trial court found that "Spencer stated by his question he believed drugs were in the
vehicle." (R. 86).
Moreover, Spencer used deception to obtain Mr. Parkin's consent. Spencer knew
he was going to search the car from his initial contact with Mr. Parkin. This is evidenced
by his testimony that he always searches vehicles if he smells marijuana. (SH:36).
Everything he did leading up to the point of obtaining consent was a deceitful way to
obtain Mr. Parkin's consent. For example, Spencer did not question Mr. Parkin about the
odor when he first noticed it, he took care of the culpable parties citation first, he required
Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol car to obtain the necessary paperwork (he did not request
the other party to sit in his patrol car), he handed Mr. Parkin his papers and then
immediately questioned him and he did not inform Mr. Parkin that he was free to leave
and that he did not have to consent. (SH:12-36).
In its response brief the State also claims that Spencer's request was not coercive.
App. Brf. at 9. However, Spencer's coercive tactic was well developed in Mr. Parkin's
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opening brief under his Miranda argument. In sum, Spencer's questioning was coercive
because he asked accusatory questions while inside of a patrol car, when he did not get
the desired answer he continued to question Mr. Parkin, after Mr. Parkin denied smoking
marijuana Spencer requested to search his car to make sure there wasn't any marijuana.
Based on the totality of the circumstances Mr. Parkin's consent was not freely and
voluntarily given, and in any event, while consent is a factual finding, voluntariness is a
legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1272 (Utah 1993). Further, in the event consent is determined to be voluntary, then the
second prong of the voluntariness test as articulated and used in State v. Hansen, must be
used to determine whether the consent was valid. 63 P.3d 650. The trial court did not
address the required second prong test.
The second prong "Exploitation Analysis" as articulated under Hansen, requires
the trial court to focus on the relationship between "official misconduct and subsequently
discovered evidence to determine if excluding evidence will effectively deter future
illegalities." Id. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the exploitation
analysis has three factors that have particular relevance in determining validity of consent,
to wit: (1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct; (2) the presence of
intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention
and consent. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
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The aforementioned factors weigh in favor of a finding that the police illegality
tainted and rendered invalid any consent to search that Mr. Parkin may have given. First,
the temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent was immediate. His
consent was simultaneous with his illegal detention. Secondly, there were no intervening
circumstances that occurred between the illegal detention and Mr. Parkin's consent.
Spencer requested consent to search Mr. Parkin's car while he was still being illegally
detained. Finally, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct was severe.
Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for thirty minutes without noticing any indications of
impairment or criminal activity. (SH:37). He was not even cited for the accident that
invited Spencer's presence. (SH:17-18). Despite making no observations of criminal
activity other than the odor of marijuana, Spencer required Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol
car where he proceeded to question him. (SH: 18-19). Finally, when Mr. Parkin stated
that he has friends that smoke Spencer should have let him on his way. Instead, Spencer
continued to pursue his hunch that there was marijuana in the car by requesting consent.
Because Mr. Parkin's consent to search his care was both involuntary and tainted by the
prior illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the search should a have been
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine introduced in Wong Sun v. U.S., 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963) stated that a trial court must determine "whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
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has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." When conducting these analyses, a
court should determine whether excluding such evidence will effectively deter future
illegalities. See State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d at 665 (citing State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d
289,292 (Utah 1995). The exclusionary rule is judicially created to safeguard individuals
against Fourth Amendment violations. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10(1995). The
United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to apply to all state criminal
proceedings by holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Larocco adopted
the federal exclusionary rule as a state rule, holding that the "exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article 1 section 14."
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (no longer good law for a different point
of law).
In the instant case, the exclusionary rule should have been applied to all
evidence against Mr. Parkin as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." Police exploitation
existed in the instant case because there were no intervening factors. The evidence
obtained by Spencer occurred during his purposeful and flagrant official misconduct.
Spencer decided to ignore Mr. Parkin's constitutional rights when he illegally seized him,
and perpetuated the taint when he coerced Mr. Parkin into consenting to the search of his
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vehicle. The exclusionary rule was created to prohibit this type of conscious disregard of
a constitutional guaranty by an officer.
Furthermore, the trial courts failure to exclude the evidence in this case does not
prohibit an officer from seizing anyone he or she suspects to have recently ingested
marijuana based on the odor and then coerce them into giving up any evidence, even if
the seizure was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Thus, all incentives for
officers to obtain reasonable articulable suspicion will be removed. Accordingly, because
all evidence obtained by Spencer was a direct exploitation of Mr. Parkin's illegal seizure
it should have been excluded as tainted by the illegal seizure.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, and on the facts and argument
presented in his opening brief, Mr. Parkin requests this Court to reverse his conviction.
Or in the alternative, asks this Court to find that the trial court erred in denying his
Motion to Suppress and remand the case to the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

5th day of April, 2007.

BRENT GOLD
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